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Check-the-Box Regs and
Gift Tax Discounts
By Wendy C. Gerzog
Pierre v. Commissioner1 examines whether a donor’s
gifts of entity interests in a single-member limited liabil-
ity company that she elected to treat as a disregarded
entity under the check-the-box regulations will be rechar-
acterized as transfers of LLC assets. The Pierre opinion
covered only this issue; a separate opinion will address
the application of the step transaction doctrine and the
amount of the valuation discounts, if any.2
In 2000 a wealthy friend gave Suzanne Pierre, a New
York resident, $10 million in cash. She then organized
Pierre Family LLC, but did not elect to have the entity
taxed as a corporation for federal tax purposes. Eleven
days later, she created two trusts, one for her son,
Jacques, and the other for her granddaughter, Kati.
Almost two months after creating the trusts, the taxpayer
contributed $4.25 million, consisting of cash and market-
able securities, to her family LLC. Twelve days later, she
gave all of her interests in her family LLC to the two
trusts.
The taxpayer filed her gift tax return valuing her
transfers with discounts attendant to a transfer of LLC
interests.3 Examining her returns and denying her those
discounts, the government determined that the taxpay-
er’s gifts were of the underlying assets of the LLC.
Both the taxpayer and the government agree that the
LLC is a valid separate entity from the taxpayer under
New York law and that the LLC is disregarded under the
check-the-box regulations ‘‘for federal tax purposes.’’4
However, the taxpayer maintains that ‘‘for Federal gift
tax valuation purposes, State law, not Federal tax law,
determines the nature of a taxpayer’s interest in property
transferred and the legal rights inherent in that property
interest’’5 and that under New York law an LLC member
has no interest in specific property of the LLC. The
government, however, contends that because the entity is
ignored for federal tax purposes under the check-the-box
regulations, the taxpayer has transferred cash and stock
to the trusts.6
The court first described what it called the ‘‘Federal
gift tax valuation regime,’’ citing the regulation defining
fair market value7 and the Supreme Court cases Bromley
v. McCaughn8 and Morgan v. Commissioner.9 The court
relied on Bromley for the axiom that the gift tax is an
excise tax rather than a direct tax10 and onMorgan for the
principle that state law creates property rights and inter-
ests, and federal tax law defines their tax treatment.11
The court elaborated by stating that ‘‘the interest was
created by State law, respected by the Court, and taxed
pursuant to the Federal estate and gift tax provisions.’’12
The court held that the taxpayer did not have a property
interest in the LLC’s underlying assets and therefore she
had transferred her only property interests in the entity
under state law — her LLC interests themselves — to the
trusts.
The court proceeded to explore whether the check-the-
box regulations should alter its conclusion. On this point
the court explained that those regulations were created to
‘‘simplify the classification of hybrid entities’’13 by allow-
ing a business entity to ‘‘elect to be classified as an
association or to be disregarded as an entity separate
from its owner’’; if no election is made, a domestic
eligible entity with a single owner is treated as identical
1Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 2 (2009), Doc 2009-19089,
2009 TNT 162-4. Judge Wells wrote the majority opinion of the
court and was joined by Judges Cohen, Foley, Vasquez, Thorn-
ton, Marvel, Goeke, Wherry, Gustafson, and Morrison.
2Id. at 3, n.3.
3She contends that both lack of control and nonmarketability
discounts apply to value the gifts of LLC interests. Id. at 7. She
also maintains that the government bears the burden of proof on
factual issues, but, as the court explained, the only issue in this
opinion was decided as a matter of law. Id. at n.8.
4See reg. section 301.7701-1(a)(1), -3(a), and -3(b).
5Pierre, at 6.
6Id. The government states that ‘‘petitioner made gifts equal
to the total value of the assets of Pierre LLC less the value of the
promissory notes she received from the trusts.’’
7See reg. section 25.2512-1(b) (incorporating the hypothetical
willing buyer/willing seller concept).
8280 U.S. 124 (1929).
9309 U.S. 78 (1940).
10Pierre, at 9.
11Id.
12Id. at 10.
13Id. at 13.
Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of
Baltimore School of Law.
This article discusses the recent Tax Court decision
in Pierre and the effect for gift tax purposes of an
entity’s classification made under the check-the-box
regulations. The court was split on what those regu-
lations mean when they stated that an entity is to be
disregarded ‘‘for federal tax purposes.’’
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to that owner.14 According to the court, the regulations
merely clarified whether an entity should be taxed as a
corporation or as a partnership and were not intended to
affect how a transfer of a validly formed LLC should be
taxed for federal gift tax purposes.
The court distinguished the government’s precedents
as not material to Pierre. McNamee v. Dept. of the Treasury
dealt with whether a single-owner LLC was required to
pay the entity’s withholding taxes and therefore was not
on point regarding gift taxes.15 Both Shepherd v. Commis-
sioner16 and Senda v. Commissioner17 examined the se-
quence of the donor’s funding of the family entity and
the donor’s gifts of entity interests to determine whether
the donor had made an indirect gift. Finally, the court
also rejected the taxpayer’s reliance on Mirowski v. Com-
missioner18 although the court noted in Mirowski that its
holding did not preclude a single-member LLC from
qualifying for the bona fide sales exception in section
2036, which would be the result if the government’s
position was upheld in Pierre.19
Essentially, the court viewed the check-the-box rules
narrowly, as a means of classifying the LLC for tax
purposes. The court rejected the principle that the regu-
lations define the property interest the taxpayer trans-
ferred for federal gift tax purposes:
To conclude that because an entity elected the
classification rules set forth in the check-the-box
regulations, the long-established Federal gift tax
valuation regime is overturned as to single-member
LLCs would be ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the
Federal estate and gift tax statutes as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.20
The court referred to sections 2701-2704 as examples of
congressional limitations to correct valuation abuses and
stated that a regulation should not be used to change
precedent or what it called ‘‘the federal gift tax valuation
regime.’’21 The court concluded that the taxpayer had
transferred LLC interests and not the underlying prop-
erty of the LLC.
Judge Cohen, in her concurring opinion,22 explained
how she, as author of Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v.
Commissioner,23 which followed McNamee, agreed with
the majority that those cases were classification cases
applying the check-the-box regulations in the employ-
ment tax context unlike Pierre, which involved valuing
LLC interests that the owner gave as gifts to her family.
While the regulations might be used to identify the
transferor (the LLC or the owner) to determine who is
liable for gift tax, the issue in Pierre involved the transfer
by the owner of LLC interests.24 Judge Cohen agreed
with the majority that the regulations should be narrowly
applied: ‘‘A targeted solution to a particular problem
should not be distorted to achieve a comprehensive
overhaul of a well-established body of law.’’25 Judge
Cohen said the regulation was ambiguous because it
contained the language ‘‘for federal tax purposes’’ rather
than ‘‘for all Federal tax purposes,’’ and the majority’s
interpretation was compatible with section 7701(a) limi-
tations and valuation principles.26
In the first of two dissenting opinions, Judge Halpern
disagreed both with the majority’s approach and its
conclusions.27 The regulations explain the consequence of
disregarding a single owner LLC as separate from its
owner: ‘‘its activities are treated in the same manner as a
sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the owner.’’28
Thus, for all tax purposes, the LLC’s activities are treated
the same as those of a sole proprietorship.29 The taxpay-
er’s argument ignores the regulation’s activities instruc-
tion and that a sole proprietorship lacks any separate
identity from its owner. Judge Halpern explained that
treating the transfer of an interest in a single-member
disregarded entity as a transfer of an interest in the
entity’s assets is compatible with the willing buyer/
willing seller valuation regulation,30 which may be ap-
plied by ‘‘considering the LLC’s property . . . as the
property petitioner transferred when she transferred
interests in the LLC.’’31
Judge Halpern cited several examples of how the
government’s position in Pierre has been consistent for
the last 10 years.32 He said that while the rulings con-
cerned sales for income tax purposes, ‘‘the difference
between a sale and a gift is a difference in degree, not in
kind.’’33 Moreover, inMcNamee,while state law protected
the appellant from his LLC’s liabilities, the federal regu-
lations allowing him to waive that shield to benefit from
escaping the double taxation of a corporate entity classi-
fication extended to his employment tax liabilities. Thus,
Judge Halpern interpreted McNamee as holding that
14Reg. section 301.7701-3(a) and (b)(1)(ii).
15McNamee v. Dept. of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007),
Doc 2007-12575, 2007 TNT 101-13.
16Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), Doc 2000-
27642, 2000 TNT 209-15, aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002), Doc
2002-5259, 2002 TNT 42-16.
17Senda v. Commissioner, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006), Doc
2006-436, 2006 TNT 5-12. See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Return to
Senda: Order Determinative for FLP Discounts,’’ Tax Notes, Feb.
13, 2006, p. 791, Doc 2006-1385, or 2006 TNT 30-40.
18Estate of Anna Mirowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-
74, Doc 2008-6681, 2008 TNT 60-8. See Gerzog, ‘‘Tax Court FLP
Confusion: Mirowski,’’ Tax Notes, July 21, 2008, p. 263, Doc
2008-14927, or 2008 TNT 141-30.
19Pierre, at 18-19, citing Mirowski at 56.
20Pierre, at 20 (emphasis in original).
21Id. at 21.
22Judges Wells, Foley, Vasquez, Thornton, Marvel, Goeke,
Wherry, and Gustafson joined in this opinion. Id. at 30.
23Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 7
(2009), Doc 2009-7255, 2009 TNT 60-18.
24Pierre, at 23-24.
25Id. at 25.
26Id. at 26-30 (emphasis in original).
27Judges Kroupa and Holmes agreed with Judge Halpern’s
dissenting opinion. Id. at 48.
28Id. at 31-32, citing reg. section 301.7701-2(a).
29Id. at 32.
30Id. at 33, n.1.
31Id. at 34.
32Id. at 35-37, citing Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434, Doc
1999-2045, 1999 TNT 10-6, and three letter rulings (see n.3).
33Id. at 37.
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‘‘Federal law, in the form of the check-the-box regula-
tions, does define the property rights and interests so
transferred.’’34 Essentially, while Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Com-
missioner35 does not require the income tax provisions to
be interpreted in pari materia with gift tax provisions,
‘‘there is nothing in the definitions in section 7701(a)(1)
through (3) of ‘Person’, ‘Partnership’, and ‘Corporation’
that indicates that those terms should have different
meanings for purposes of the income and gift tax provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code.’’36
Finally, Judge Halpern construed the majority opinion
as rejecting the validity of the activities instruction in the
check-the-box regulations ‘‘as an invalid construction of
the statute.’’37 When they were approved, the check-the-
box regulations represented a radical change from case
law and regulatory precedent,38 including their effective
overruling of the 1935 Supreme Court case Morrissey v.
Commissioner.39 Because they were such a fundamental
alteration from then-current law, the validity of the
regulations was open to question; McNamee, Littriello v.
United States,40 and Med. Practice Solutions Inc. resolved
that uncertainty. ‘‘If the check-the-box regulations trump
Supreme Court precedent regarding the role of State law
in determining entity classification for Federal income or
employment tax purposes, then surely they must also
supersede judicial precedent respecting State law con-
cepts of property rights for Federal gift (and estate) tax
purposes.’’41
Judge Kroupa, the trial judge in Pierre, wrote the
second dissent.42 This opinion began:
The majority opinion allows an octogenarian tax-
payer to give away $4.25 million in cash and
marketable securities at a substantial discount in
gift taxes because she put them in a limited liability
company (LLC), despite a regulation telling us that
‘‘for federal tax purposes,’’ that LLC should be
‘‘disregarded.’’ The majority is either ignoring the
plain language of the regulation or silently invali-
dating it.43
Judge Kroupa explained that the effect of the check-
the-box regulations is to treat the owner of a disregarded
entity as the owner of LLC property; underMcNamee, the
LLC’s activities are considered like those of the owner’s
sole proprietorship.44
According to Judge Kroupa, the language of the
regulation plainly reads: ‘‘for federal tax purposes.’’
Further, when Treasury has intended for a regulation to
be applied solely for federal income tax purposes, it has so
used that specific language numerous times. Had Treas-
ury not wanted the regulation to apply for gift tax
purposes, it could have used clear limiting language:
‘‘Tellingly, the preamble to the amended regulations
states that single-owner entities ‘generally would con-
tinue to be treated as disregarded entities for other
federal tax purposes’ after amended.’’45 Moreover, the
majority did not address the government’s consistent
treatment in its rulings for the past 10 years of an electing
LLC’s single-member owner as the LLC’s asset owner.46
Judge Kroupa maintained that the majority invali-
dated the check-the-box regulations as applied to federal
gift tax without sufficient analysis. When the pertinent
statute is ambiguous, a mere statement that there is a
conflicting historical gift tax regime promulgated before
the applicable regulations cannot invalidate them. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ‘‘has already held that
section 7701 is ambiguous as to the Federal tax treatment
of single-member LLCs.’’47 Judge Kroupa wrote that
these regulations determine whether the entity has an
existence separate from its owner for federal tax pur-
poses, not how the entity is to be taxed.48
Moreover, Judge Kroupa said the majority misstated
the issue and presented a false dichotomy between an
entity’s classification and its valuation. The gift tax
regulations do not explain how to value an interest in a
single-member LLC although they do clarify how to
value interests in a corporation, partnership, or sole
proprietorship: ‘‘Accordingly, we must first ‘classify’ the
entity, and only then can we ‘value’ its interests.’’49 The
check-the-box regulations elucidate the federal tax con-
sequences of a taxpayer’s election to treat the entity as
identical to the owner, like in a sole proprietorship; that
is, despite state law classification of the entity, the regu-
lations allow for a different federal tax treatment. ‘‘It
therefore does not matter whether Sate law recognizes an
LLC as a valid entity or provides that a member has no
interest in any of the specific property of the LLC.’’50
Judge Kroupa criticized the majority for diminishing
the importance of both McNamee and Littriello on the
ground that they are not gift tax cases: ‘‘The majority fails
to recognize that the single owner’s liability for employ-
ment taxes turns upon disregarding the LLC for Federal
tax purposes rather than upon the identity of the tax-
payer.’’51 Littriello held that a single owner ‘‘owns all the
assets, is liable for all debts, and operates in an individual
34Id. at 42. ‘‘In other words, the Court of Appeals inMcNamee
construed the check-the-box regulations to modify the bundle of
rights that Mr. McNamee enjoyed under local law and that
constituted ownership of the LLC.’’
35Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1947).
36Pierre, at 44.
37Id.
38Id. at 45.
39Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
40Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), Doc
2007-9567, 2007 TNT 73-16.
41Pierre, at 46-47.
42Id. at 49. Judges Colvin, Halpern, Gale, Holmes, and Paris
joined Judge Kroupa’s dissenting opinion.
43Id.
44Id. at 50.
45Id. at 52, citing REG-114371-05 (Oct. 18, 2005), Doc 2005-
21024, 2005 TNT 200-8.
46Id. at 53-54.
47Id. at 56, citing McNamee, at 107. Pierre is appealable to the
Second Circuit.
48Id. at 57.
49Id. at 58.
50Id.
51Id. at 60.
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capacity.’’52 Both circuit courts emphasized that the tax-
payer had an election option, just as the taxpayer had in
Pierre. If the taxpayer had elected to treat the LLC as a
corporation, the federal tax consequences of her entity
choice would have been different.53 Even the court’s own
opinion, Med. Practice Solutions, stated that ‘‘a single
member LLC ‘and its sole member are a single taxpayer
or person to whom notice is given.’’’54 Judge Kroupa
wrote that ‘‘despite the majority’s wish, Pierre LLC does
not exist apart from petitioner for gift tax purposes, and
petitioner should be treated as holding its assets.’’55
Finally, Judge Kroupa explained the broad scope of the
gift tax statutes as the Supreme Court emphasized both
in Commissioner v. Wemyss56 and more recently inDickman
v. Commissioner.57 Yet, notwithstanding the wide cover-
age of the gift tax, according to Judge Kroupa, ‘‘the
majority would require Congressional action before any
State law property right could be disregarded for Federal
gift tax purposes,’’ she wrote.58
Bromley, Morgan, Wemyss, and Dickman
Bromley is a case that deals with the constitutionality of
the gift tax based on the taxpayer’s argument that it was
a direct tax and not apportioned in violation of the third
clause of section 2 and the fourth clause of section 9 of
Article I and that it lacked uniformity and deprived him
of property without due process in violation of the first
clause of section 8 of Article I and the Fifth Amend-
ment.59 Bromley upheld the validity of the gift tax on the
basis of being an excise tax on the transfer of wealth.
InMorgan the Supreme Court distinguished between a
special and a general power of appointment. The deci-
sion to tax the latter and not the former was based on the
potential for abuse because of the latter’s unlimited
potential appointees. The Court analyzed the extent of
rights to dispose of property under local law to distin-
guish between the two types of powers of appointment.
Thus, the Court said, ‘‘State law creates legal interests
and rights. The federal Revenue Acts designate what
interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.’’60
In Wemyss the Supreme Court held that donative
intent was not required to impose the gift tax: ‘‘Congress
chose not to require an ascertainment of what too often is
an elusive state of mind. . . . And Treasury Regulations
have emphasized that common law considerations were
not embodied in the gift tax.’’61
Dickman emphasized the expansive sweep of the gift
taxes, saying that ‘‘the gift tax was designed to encom-
pass all transfers of property and property rights having
significant value.’’62 Further, the Court underlined the
connection between gift taxes and income taxes: ‘‘We are
bound to effectuate Congress’ intent to protect the estate
and income tax systems with a broad and comprehensive
tax upon all ‘[transfers] of property by gift.’’’63 Instead of
separating gift taxes from income taxes, the Court em-
phasized the interconnectedness among the federal taxes.
Analysis and Conclusion
While the majority and the dissents may be described
as adopting, respectively, a narrow or broad reading of
the check-the-box regulations, I agree with the dissenting
opinions because, although I’m not sure what is meant by
‘‘the Federal gift tax valuation regime’’ (I have never
heard that term before), if there is such a separately
defined system, it is much more like the characterization
of the dissenters.
Although the gift tax was enacted principally to
support the estate tax, Congress64 and the Supreme
Court65 have called the gift tax the backup to the income
tax system.66 Where the two tax systems have varied, the
gift tax regulations have explained that divergence. For
example, the two taxes differ about the role of donative
intent in their definitions of a gift. Under Commissioner v.
Duberstein,67 for income tax purposes, donative intent is
essential for a gift under the section 102 exclusion; by
contrast, for gift tax purposes, donative intent is not
52Id., citing Littriello, at 378.
53Id. at 60-61.
54Id., at 60, citing Med. Practice Solutions, at 5.
55Id.
56Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).
57Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 333-334 (1984).
58Pierre, at 62.
59Bromley, at 135.
60Morgan, at 80. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967), is often then cited to describe the proper regard to be
given lower state court interpretations of a determination of
those property interests.
61Wemyss, at 306.
62Dickman, at 334 (emphasis added).
63Id. at 344.
64Congress intended the gift tax and the income tax to have
the same top marginal tax bracket to prevent the erosion of the
income tax base that had been forecast by tax professionals. See
Statement of Managers for Conference Agreement on H.R. 1836,
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
107th Cong., 1st Sess. 91. See also infra note 67; testimony of
Lauren Y. Detzel, House Ways and Means Committee hearing,
Doc 2001-8293, 2001 TNT 56-83.
65See, e.g., Dickman, at 344, Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176,
179, n.1 (1943) (‘‘the gift tax was passed not only to prevent
estate tax avoidance, but also to prevent income tax avoidance
through reducing yearly income and thereby escaping the effect
of progressive surtax rates’’); Est. of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 39, 47 (1939) (‘‘one purpose of the gift tax was to prevent or
compensate for the loss of surtax upon income where large
estates are split up by gifts to numerous donees’’).
66Although the 2001 act repealed the estate tax in 2010, the
gift tax was retained to prevent erosion of the income tax base.
See Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Mitchell M. Gans, ‘‘Wealth
Transfer Tax Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning,’’
Tax Notes, Jan. 15, 2001, p. 393, Doc 2001-1503, or 2001 TNT
10-110; John Buckley, ‘‘Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals: Implica-
tions for the Income Tax,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 22, 2001, p. 539, Doc
2001-2147, or 2001 TNT 14-159; Martin A. Sullivan, ‘‘JCT Esti-
mates Widespread Evasion With Gift Tax Repeal,’’ Tax Notes,
Apr. 2, 2001, p. 10, Doc 2001-9607, or 2001 TNT 64-10; John
Buckley, ‘‘Estate and Gift Taxes: What Will Congress Do Next?’’
Tax Notes, June 18, 2001, p. 2069, Doc 2001-16894, or 2001 TNT
117-71. (‘‘Retention of the gift tax is an attempt to prevent
widespread income tax avoidance. The fact that the new law
provides a lower gift tax exemption than estate tax exemption
also is a response to potential income tax avoidance.’’)
67Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-286 (1960).
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required for a taxable gift under section 2512 although
donative intent may be an element showing that an
unequal transfer is a bad bargain in the commercial realm
that is not subject to gift tax.68 The similarity between a
sale in the income tax context and a gift for gift tax
purposes is integral to the definition of a gift for gift tax
purposes. Not requiring donative intent, a gift for gift tax
purposes is an unequal exchange. Section 2512(b) defines
that gift as follows: ‘‘Where property is transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money’s worth, the amount by which the value of the
property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift.’’ Judge Halpern’s analysis relating sales
for income tax purposes and gifts for gift tax purposes
reflects the dollar equivalence or inequality of, respec-
tively, a sale or a gift as defined in that statute.
In any event, the regulation is clear: ‘‘Pierre LLC is to
be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner ‘for
federal tax purposes’ under the check-the-box regula-
tions.’’69 It is more reasonable to read those words as they
plainly read rather than to parse a narrow exception for
income tax purposes, especially when courts have al-
ready extended them to employment taxes, and when
there is a clear kinship between income taxes and gift
taxes. Once the wrapper is ignored for tax purposes, as
the dissent asserted, the taxpayer transferred cash and
marketable securities to her family members for no
consideration in money or money’s worth.
Nor are there sufficient equities on the taxpayer’s side
to make one question the legal reasoning of the dissents’
opinions. The taxpayer is essentially saying, ‘‘Heads I
win, tails you lose.’’ Although the court will address the
application of the step transaction doctrine and the
valuation discount in a separate opinion, the taxpayer
was not unaware that this transaction was essentially a
shell game.
68Reg. section 25.2511-1(g)(1) (‘‘donative intent on the part of
the transferor is not an essential element in the application of the
gift tax to the transfer’’); reg. section 25.2512-8 (‘‘a sale, ex-
change, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary
course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s
length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as
made for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money’s worth’’). 69Pierre, at 6 (emphasis added).
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